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While it has become nearly axiomatic for observers of world affairs to contend that the U.S.-led postwar order is under growing, if not unprecedented, duress, there is little consensus about what architecture, if any, might replace it. A recent assessment ventures that the successor to the global system of governance we have known since the Second World War [may be] not another order but the absence of one. It is possible that the world, squeezed between the incompatible visions of a retreating U.S. and a resurgent China, is already hurtling toward chaos.

虽然对于世界事务观察家来说,美国领导的战后秩序即使不是史无前例的,也是日益增长的,这已经成为几乎不言而喻的事实,但对于什么样的架构( 如果有的话) 可能取代它,人们几乎没有达成共识。
最近的一项评估认为,我们自第二次世界大战以来所熟知的全球治理体系的继承者可能不是另一种秩序,而是没有秩序。
很有可能,夹在美国撤退和中国复兴这两个不可兼容的愿景之间的世界,已经在朝着混乱的方向疾驰。



There is also growing concern about the mobilization of disintegrationist elements within Europe. In a speech in April last year, French president Emmanuel Macron warned that “a sort of European civil war is reappearing,” observing that “our differences, sometimes our national egoisms, appear more important than what unites us in relation to the rest of the world.” Even more ominously, he concluded that a “fascination with illiberalism…is growing by the day.” Examples of that fascination abound. Italy’s interior minister has called for a census of the country’s Roma population. Austria’s chancellor has urged his country to form an “axis of the willing against illegal migration” with Germany and Italy. In a multifaceted effort to limit George Soros’ influence, Hungary has forced the closure of Central European University, a prestigious Budapest-based institution funded by the philanthropist; pressured the Open Society Foundation until Soros declared that its Budapest operations were no longer safe; and passed a “Stop Soros” law that effectively criminalizes efforts to provide humanitarian aid and legal assistance to undocumented immigrants. The country’s prime minister has declared that: “Rather than try to fix a liberal democracy that has run aground, we will build a 21st-century Christian democracy.”

人们还日益关切欧洲内部动员分裂分子的情况。
在去年4月的一次演讲中,法国总统埃马纽埃尔 · 马克龙警告称,“欧洲内战正在重演”。
他指出,“我们的分歧,有时我们的民族利己主义,似乎比我们与世界其他国家的联系更为重要。” 更不祥的是,他的结论是“对非自由主义的迷恋... ... 与日俱增。” 这种迷恋的例子比比皆是。
意大利内政部长呼吁对该国的罗姆人(译注:就是吉普赛人)进行普查。
奥地利总理敦促他的国家与德国和意大利一起形成“反对非法移民的意愿轴心”。
为了限制乔治 · 索罗斯的影响力,匈牙利尝试了多方面的努力,迫使中欧大学关闭,这是一所总部设在布达佩斯的著名机构,由慈善家提供资金,匈牙利向开放社会基金会施压,直到索罗斯宣布布达佩斯的业务不再安全,并通过了一项”禁止索罗斯”的法律,该法律实际上将向非法移民提供人道主义援助和法律援助的行为定为刑事犯罪,该国总理宣称: “与其试图修复搁浅的自由民主,我们不如建立一个21世纪的基督教民主。”

Some perspective is in order. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a sufficiently confident and widespread authoritarian ascent that, according to political theorist John Keane, only eleven electoral democracies remained by 1941. Franklin Roosevelt warned in a speech in March of that year that the United States would have to furnish “fuel in ever-increasing amounts” to safeguard “the great flame of democracy from the blackout of barbarism.” Today there are 116 electoral democracies—down from 120 two decades ago, concerningly, but still an impressive number.

有一些观点是恰当的, 二十世纪上半叶我们见证了一个充满自信和广泛传播的威权主义国家崛起,根据政治理论家 John Keane 的说法,到1941年只剩下十一个选举民主国家。
富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福在当年3月的一次演讲中警告说,美国将不得不提供“越来越多的燃料” ,以保护“民主的伟大火焰免遭野蛮时代的熄灭” ,令人担忧的是,如今只有116个选举民主国家,比20年前的120个有所下降,当然,这仍然是一个令人印象深刻的数字。



It would be premature to suggest, however, that globalization is reversing. The World Bank reports that “net capital inflows [into developing countries] entered positive territory in 2017, following two years of large contractions”—a development that “has been facilitated by the improving economic outlook in several large emerging economies.” There are hopeful signs on trade flows as well. Consider an oft-cited gauge of globalization, the ratio between the growth rate of world merchandise trade and that of real gross world product. Historically hovering at 1.5, it fell to an average of 1.0 between 2011 and 2016; in 2017, however, it rebounded to 1.5. The World Trade Organization (WTO) forecast last April that trade would grow at 4.4 percent in 2018 and 4 percent this year, compared to the post-crisis average of three percent.

然而,认为全球化正在逆转还为时过早。
世界银行报告称,“(流入发展中国家的) 净资本在连续两年大幅收缩之后,于2017年进入正值水平”——这一发展趋势“得益于几个大型新兴经济体经济前景的改善” ,在贸易流动方面也出现了令人鼓舞的迹象。
考虑一个经常被引用的全球化指标,即世界商品贸易增长率与实际生产总值增长率之间的比率,历史上一直徘徊在1.5的水平,2011年到2016年间下降到了平均1.0的水平,然而在2017年,回升到了1.5。
世界贸易组织去年4月预测,2018年和今年的贸易额将分别增长4.4% 和4% ,而危机后的平均增长率为3% 。

Continued progress on bilateral and regional trade deals suggests that this pace may endure. Eleven of the twelve countries that were negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership have finalized the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, covering some 13.5 percent of gross world product (GWP). Japan and the European unx (eu) have signed a bilateral trade agreement, the world’s largest, that accounts for roughly 30 percent of GWP. Negotiations are also inching forward on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a sixteen-country arrangement that, too, would incorporate some 30 percent of GWP.

双边和地区贸易协定的持续进展表明,这种速度可能会持续下去。
正在谈判《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》的12个国家最终达成了《跨太平洋伙伴关系全面进步协定》,涵盖了全球生产总值 (GWP) 的13.5%。
日本和欧盟签署了一项双边贸易协定,这是世界上最大的贸易协定,约占全球生产总值的30% 。
关于区域全面经济伙伴关系的谈判也在缓慢向前推进,这是一个由16个国家组成的协议,也将纳入约30% 的全球生产总值。

The third reason some observers see parallels with the 1930s—and also, incidentally, with the Cold War—is the return of great power competition, with Russia and China occupying center stage. But neither country is posing a frontal assault on the postwar order; the former is opportunistically obstructive, while the latter is sextively revisionist. Moscow is continuously challenged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its west and increasingly dependent on China to its east. Beijing’s ambitions, meanwhile, are constrained not only by an increasingly apprehensive Washington but also by strong powers in Canberra, Delhi, Seoul and Tokyo that seek to forestall the resumption of a Sinocentric hierarchy in the Asia-Pacific. While the current order is undoubtedly under strain, there is at least an order to defend. Today, moreover, despite the present vagaries in its foreign policy, the United States is the world’s lone superpower; in the 1930s, by contrast, despite commanding the world’s largest economy, Washington’s military and diplomatic influence beyond its borders lagged far behind its industrial heft.

第三个原因是大国竞争的回归,俄罗斯和中国占据了中心舞台。
但这两个国家都没有正面攻击战后秩序,前者是机会主义式的阻碍,而后者是选择性的修正主义者。
莫斯科西面不断受到北大西洋公约组织的挑战,东面越来越依赖中国。
与此同时,中国的雄心受到限制,不仅是因为华盛顿方面越来越不安,还因为堪培拉、德里、首尔和东京试图阻止亚太地区恢复以中国为中心的统治,
尽管目前的秩序无疑处于紧张状态,但至少还有一个可防御的秩序。
此外,今天,尽管美国的外交政策变幻莫测,但美国是世界上唯一的超级大国,相比之下,在20世纪30年代,尽管美国是世界上最大的经济体,但华盛顿的军事和外交影响力远远落后于其工业影响力。

Perhaps even more common is the suggestion that the United States is entering into a new Cold War. There is little agreement on the antagonist in this alleged confrontation: some say that it is Russia; others, China; yet others, a Sino-Russian authoritarian axis; and even some, the menace of terrorism, in its ever-changing structure and roster of outfits. That this number of actors can be characterized as America’s putative opponent in a new Cold War suggests an intrinsic limitation to the analogy.

也许更常见的说法是美国正在进入一场新的冷战。
在这场所谓的对抗中,人们对对手的看法几乎没有达成一致:
有人说是俄罗斯,有人说是中国,还有人说是中俄威权轴心, 甚至还有人说是恐怖主义的威胁,其结构和组织名单不断在变化。
在新冷战中,这么多角色可以被描述为美国的假定对手,这表明这种类比有其内在的局限性。

To speak of a new Cold War is to suggest not only that the United States once more confronts a rival power with ambitions of global dominance and pretensions to a universal ideology, but also that that power can and will employ territorial aggression, proxy warfare and client states across the world in the service of its strategic obxtives. Neither of the two supposed antagonists in this sequel, though, would seem to fit this descxtion.

谈到新的冷战,不仅表明美国再次面对一个拥有全球统治野心和普遍意识形态自命不凡的敌对大国,而且表明这个大国能够并且将会使用领土侵略、代理人战争和世界各地的附庸国为其战略目标服务,然而,这部续集中的两个所谓的对手似乎都不符合这种描述。

Russia is undoubtedly a major power, commanding the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas and a veto on the United Nations Security Council. But it is a pale shadow of the Soviet unx, which, upon dissolving, yielded Russia and fourteen post-Soviet republics, three of which—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—now belong to NATO. Russia’s population is slated to decline from roughly 144 million today to 133 million by 2050, a nearly 8 percent drop. Its energy leverage in Europe, while significant, is far less than it was at the end of the Cold War; where Moscow accounted for three-quarters of the EU’s gas imports in 1990, it now accounts for under two-fifths.

俄罗斯无疑是一个大国,拥有世界上最大的核武库、世界上已探明的最大天然气储量,并在联合国安理会拥有否决权,但它只是苏联的一个苍白的影子,苏联解体后,产生了俄罗斯和十四个后苏联加盟共和国,其中拉脱维亚、立陶宛和爱沙尼亚现在属于北约。
预计到2050年,俄罗斯人口将从现在的大约1.44亿下降到1.33亿,降幅接近8% 。
俄罗斯在欧洲的能源影响力虽然很大,但远低于冷战结束时的水平——1990年,俄罗斯占欧盟天然气进口量的四分之三,如今占不到五分之二。



China’s economic progress is arguably of even greater concern to the United States. Beijing is on track to displace Washington in absolute economic size well before the middle of this century. It appears intent on constructing and anchoring an expansive Eurasian economic order, especially as seen with its work on the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative. Having been included in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of special drawing rights, the renminbi is embarking on a slow but concerted push to become a global reserve currency. Finally, Beijing is taking significant steps to boost its indigenous economic capacity; its spending on research and development increased over thirty-fold between 1995 and 2013, and the government recently announced a strategy that aims to have China become the world’s foremost leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. There is also an appreciable risk that growing trade tensions between Washington and Beijing could yield security ones; the United States increasingly regards China’s technological ambitions as a threat to its national security, while China believes that its existing degree of economic dependence on the U.S. economy gives the United States an unacceptable measure of leverage over its economy. Given that trade interdependence has been one of the few restraints to date on their competition, an erosion of that connective tissue could thrust their relationship into a far more uncertain, potentially escalatory, phase.

中国的经济发展可以说是美国更加关心的问题,在本世纪中叶之前,北京就有望在绝对经济规模上取代华盛顿。
中国似乎有意构建和巩固扩张的欧亚经济秩序,尤其是其在一带一路货币基金组织倡议方面的工作。
作为国际货币基金组织特别提款权一揽子计划一员,人民币正开始缓慢但协调一致地努力成为全球储备货币。
最后,北京正在采取重大措施提高本土经济能力;
从1995年到2013年,中国在研发方面的支出增加了30倍以上,政府最近宣布了一项战略,旨在使中国在2030年之前成为世界上人工智能领域最重要的领导者。
美国越来越认为中国的科技野心是对其国家安全的威胁,而中国认为其经济对美国经济的依赖程度使得美国对其经济的影响力达到了令人无法接受的程度。
鉴于贸易相互依赖是迄今为止对它们竞争的为数不多的限制之一,对这种结缔组织的侵蚀可能会将它们的关系推入一个更加不确定、可能升级的阶段。

Finally, an erstwhile muted ideological component of U.S.-China relations is acquiring more salience. The Chinese Communist Party’s move to end presidential term limits means that President Xi could well rule over China for as long as he lives. His policies to date suggest that Beijing’s increasing integration into the global economy, far from inducing it to temper its domestic illiberalism, has made it more confident in its authoritarianism. At the first session of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, he called Chinese governance “a great contribution to political civilization of humanity” and argued that democratic governance, “confined by interests of different political parties, classes, regions, and groups, tears society apart.” In “Document 9,” moreover, issued in April 2013, senior Party leaders warned that China had to counter “Western forces hostile to China,” including the promulgation of “constitutional democracy” and “universal values” of human rights. China is also becoming more aggressive in its crackdown on political dissidents and ethnic minorities.
In the aggregate, then, while most U.S. observers continue to emphasize both the competitive and cooperative elements of U.S.-China relations, they increasingly fear that the former are overtaking the latter.

最后,美中关系中一个从前默默无闻的意识形态因素正变得更加突出。
到目前为止,他的政策表明,北京日益融入全球经济,非但没有促使其缓和国内的不自由主义,反而使其对威权主义更加自信。
在中国人民政治协商会议第十三届全国委员会第一次会议上,他称中国的治理是“对人类政治文明的伟大贡献” ,并认为民主治理“受不同政党、阶级、地区、团体利益的限制,会撕裂社会”
此外,在2013年4月发布的《9号文件》中,党的高级领导人警告说,中国必须打击“西方敌视中国的势力” ,包括颁布“宪政民主”和人权的“普世价值观”。
中国在镇压持不同政见者和少数民族方面也变得更加积极。
因此,总体而言,尽管大多数美国观察家继续强调美中关系中的竞争与合作因素,但他们越来越担心前者正在取代后者。

Still, it is a leap too far to conclude that the United States is in a new Cold War with China. America’s confrontation with the Soviet unx spanned the entire world; today, however, Washington is the lone superpower, while Beijing remains a regional power, albeit one with an increasingly global footprint. Middle powers have far more room to benefit from U.S.-China rivalry than they did from U.S.-Soviet rivalry: they can increase their diplomatic and security ties with the United States while boosting their trade and investment relations with China. Beijing is not undertaking to export revolutionary ideology in the way that Moscow did. The United States and China have also achieved an extraordinary level of economic interdependence over the past four decades, and especially since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. In addition, notes the Brookings Institution’s Cheng Li, even as the two countries become increasingly suspicious of one another’s strategic intentions, contact between the two nations has never been broader, deeper, and more frequent than it is today—whether it be at the head of state, military, think tank, sub-national, commercial, educational, cultural, or tourism level.

尽管如此,得出美国与中国正处于一场新的冷战的结论仍然是一个太大的飞跃。
美国与苏联的对抗横跨了整个世界,然而,今天,华盛顿是唯一的超级大国,而中国仍然是一个区域强国,尽管它的足迹越来越全球化。
中等国家从美中对抗中获益的空间比从美苏对抗中获益的空间要大得多:
它们可以增进与美国的外交和安全关系,同时促进与中国的贸易和投资关系。
中国政府不会像莫斯科那样输出革命意识形态。
在过去的四十年中,尤其是自2001年中国加入世贸组织以来,美国和中国在经济上也达到了非同寻常的相互依赖程度。
此外,布鲁金斯学会的李成指出,尽管这两个国家越来越怀疑对方的战略意图,但两国之间的接触从未像今天这样广泛、深入和频繁ーー无论是在国家元首、军事、智囊团、地方、商业、教育、文化还是旅游方面。

Because the core of U.S.-China rivalry is economic and technological, not militaristic and ideological, there is greater room for pragmatic cooperation.
China recognizes that the Soviet unx erred by launching a frontal military and ideological assault on the prevailing order; it is more likely to develop its global footprint by building infrastructure than by deploying its armed forces or attempting to inculcate its ideology in distant countries. While it is pressing for greater reforms within the current system and developing a parallel architecture on the outside, it is not agitating for the system’s collapse. There is also little evidence thus far that China seeks to be a superpower in the U.S. mold.

由于中美之间的核心竞争是经济和技术竞争,而不是军国主义和意识形态竞争,因此务实合作的空间更大。
中国认识到苏联对现有秩序发动正面的军事和意识形态攻击是错误的,它更有可能通过建设基础设施来发展其全球影响力,而不是通过部署其武装力量或试图在遥远的国家灌输其意识形态。
虽然它迫切要求在现有体系内进行更大的改革,并在外部建立一个平行的架构,但它并没有煽动该体系的崩溃,到目前为止,几乎没有证据表明中国寻求成为美国模式下的超级大国。

While skeptical observers might not be as sanguine, China has real, increasingly manifest vulnerabilities at home and abroad. Protracted trade tensions with the United States have exposed frailties in Beijing’s economy, beginning with its gross debt, which grew from 171 percent of gross domestic product in the first quarter of 2008 to 299 percent in the first quarter of 2018. A confluence of phenomena—the aforementioned trade tensions, the recent collapse of a wave of peer-to-peer lending schemes, a grim demographic outlook and a scandal over tainted vaccines, among them—has dented the halo of invincibility around Xi’s rule.

虽然持怀疑态度的观察人士可能不会这么乐观,但中国在国内外确实存在着越来越明显的弱点。
与美国长期的贸易紧张关系暴露了北京经济的脆弱性,首先是其总债务,从2008年第一季度占国内生产总值的171% 增长到2018年第一季度的299% 。
一系列的现象---- 前面提到的贸易紧张局势,最近一波网络借贷公司的崩溃,严峻的人口前景和污染疫苗的丑闻---- 已经削弱了围绕X统治的不可战胜的光环。

Abroad, the BRI is encountering growing pushback, with a striking recent example coming from Malaysia. Announcing that he was canceling two Chinese-funded projects worth some $22 billion, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared: “We do not want a situation where there is a new version of colonialism happening because poor countries are unable to compete with rich countries.” While Taiwan continues to lose formal recognition, China has been unable to subdue its ambitions for independence; nor, as noted by Michal Thim of the Prague-based Association for International Affairs, has it been able to disrupt Taipei’s “extensive global engagement, including significant relationships with the United States, Europe and Japan.” Finally, its authoritarianism is coming under harsher scrutiny, with numerous reports detailing the intrusiveness of its surveillance apparatus and its widespread detainment of Uighurs.

在国外,一带一路遇到了越来越大的阻力,最近一个引人注目的例子来自马来西亚。
在宣布取消两个价值220亿美元的中国资助项目时,马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德宣布:
我们不希望出现新的殖民主义,因为贫穷国家无法与富裕国家竞争 。
尽管台湾在继续失去其它国家对它的正式承认,但中国一直未能遏制其独立野心,正如总部位于布拉格的国际事务协会的米哈尔 · 泰姆所指出的,中国也未能破坏台北“广泛的全球接触,包括与美国、欧洲和日本的重要关系” 。

If it is wrong to portray Russia as an aggrieved Eurasian player whose influence is sextive and constrained, it is at least as unhelpful to characterize it as a resurgent global power whose influence is wide-ranging and ubiquitous. And if it is misguided to depict China as a fatally hubristic upstart, it cannot be constructive to imagine it an inexorably ascendant colossus. U.S. foreign policy would be better served by adopting more nuanced assessments of the Russian and Chinese challenges than by oscillating between these exaggerations: neither reflexive complacency nor indefinite consternation will enable U.S. competitiveness over the long term.

如果把俄罗斯描绘成一个影响力有选择性和受限的受到侵害的欧亚国家是错误的,那么把俄罗斯描绘成一个影响力广泛而无处不在的复苏的全球大国至少也是无益的。
如果把中国描绘成一个傲慢得要命的暴发户是一种误导,那么把中国描绘成一个势不可挡的庞然大物同样不具有建设性。
美国的外交政策最好是对俄罗斯和中国面临的挑战进行更细致入微的评估,而不是在这些夸大之词之间摇摆:
无论是反射性的自满还是不确定的惊愕,都不会使美国长期具有竞争力。



In contending with Russia, America’s challenge is three-fold: to preserve a baseline of cooperation where vital U.S. national interests are at stake, to mitigate the irredentist tendencies of a country that waxes nostalgic for its imperial predecessors and to restore a sense of national cohesion that can resist external subversion. Whether the United States meets the China challenge over the long term, meanwhile, will depend on a number of factors: the durability of its economic growth; its ability to remain at the forefront of scientific and technological innovation; its creativity in conducting geo-economic diplomacy, especially in the Asia-Pacific; and its success in persuading long-standing allies that their national interests would be better served by helping to revitalize the postwar order than by conceding its erosion. China is a more nuanced, incremental competitor than the Soviet unx—and, for that reason, a more challenging one.

在与俄罗斯的竞争中,美国面临的挑战有三个方面:
在关系到美国重大国家利益的情况下,保持合作的基线,缓和一个怀念其帝国主义前辈的国家的领土收复主义倾向,恢复一种能够抵御外部颠覆的民族凝聚力。
与此同时,美国能否长期应对中国的挑战,将取决于几个因素:
美国经济增长的持久性,美国保持在科技创新前沿的能力,美国在开展地缘经济外交,尤其是在亚太地区开展地缘经济外交方面的创造力,以及美国能否成功说服长期盟友,让他们相信帮助振兴战后秩序,而不是承认秩序受到侵蚀,会更有利于他们的国家利益。
与苏联相比,中国是一个更加微妙、更加激进的竞争对手,因此也更具挑战性。

The absence of a decided foe has contributed to the lack of strategic discipline in U.S. foreign policy over the past quarter-century, and especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Some in Washington increasingly appears to have accepted the prospect of interminable war in the Middle East, a resignation that, if not revisited, could impose a permanent constraint on its ability to compete with China in the Asia-Pacific. The United States has now been in Afghanistan for more than seventeen years, and though it has made little to no net progress in reducing the Taliban’s share of territory in that country, there is growing controversy on whether it intends to extricate itself. The war in Iraq, meanwhile, is well over fifteen years old, and the United States still has some 5,200 troops there—plus another 2,000 or so in Syria—to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State.

在过去的四分之一世纪里,尤其是2001年9月11日之后,美国外交政策缺乏战略性的原因之一就是没有一个坚定的敌人。
华盛顿的一些人似乎越来越接受中东地区可能爆发无休止战争的前景。
如果不重新考虑这一问题,可能会对与中国在亚太地区竞争的能力构成永久性限制。
美国在阿富汗已经超过17年了,虽然在减少塔利班在阿富汗的领土份额方面几乎没有取得任何进展,但是关于美国是否打算脱离阿富汗的争议越来越大。
与此同时,伊拉克战争已经持续了15年多,为了防止伊斯兰国重新崛起,美国仍然在那里驻扎了大约5200名士兵,另外还在叙利亚驻扎了大约2000名士兵。

If the world is neither revisiting the interwar period nor embarking on a sequel to the Cold War, where exactly is it heading? There is no shortage of answers: a new era of U.S. preeminence, Chinese preeminence, a U.S.-China “G2,” multipolarity, regional spheres of influence, nonpolarity and a vacuum in order are just a few that observers have offered. Perhaps the most accurate answer is also the most banal: it is hard to say. While the postwar order is eroding, there is no readily apparent replacement in the offing. The National Intelligence Council posits that “[t]he net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system.”

如果世界既不回顾两次世界大战之间的时期,也不着手进行冷战的续集,那么它究竟将走向何方?
这里不乏答案:
美国卓越的新时代、中国卓越的地位、美中“两国集团”(G2)、多极化、地区势力范围、非极性和有序的真空,这些只是观察人士提供的少数几个答案。
也许最准确的答案也是最平庸的:
很难说。
尽管战后秩序正在受到侵蚀,但近期并没有明显的替代品。
美国国家情报委员会断定,“国家内部和国家之间的紧张局势不断升级,以及恐怖主义威胁不断增加,其净效应将是更严重的全球混乱,以及有关国际体系中的规则、制度和权力分配等相当多的问题。”

Perhaps the biggest question involves the role of the United States. In the 1930s it was an emerging power in a world without a clearly defined order. During the Cold War it was one pole of a generally bipolar order. There was a fleeting, roughly seventeen-year period between the end of the Cold War and the onset of the global financial crisis in which, possessing a level of preeminence that it is unlikely to ever reclaim, it proactively sought to diffuse the norms and bolster the institutions it established at the outset of the postwar era. Between the downturn and the inauguration of President Donald Trump, an even shorter interval, it tried to adapt the order in view of the grievances, capabilities and ambitions of core emerging powers. Today, however, under the Trump administration, the United States is both a central pillar of today’s order and one of its principal challengers—a duality whose oddity is difficult to overstate.

也许最大的问题涉及到美国的角色。
上世纪30年代,它是一个没有明确定义秩序的世界中的新兴力量,在冷战期间,它是两极秩序中的一极,从冷战结束到全球金融危机爆发之间,有一段短暂的、大约17年的时间。
在这段时间里,中国拥有一定程度的卓越地位,而这种卓越地位永远不可能被重新树立起来,中国积极主动地寻求打破常规,并加强其在战后时代初期建立的机构。
从经济低迷到唐纳德 · 特朗普就职,间隔时间更短,中国试图根据核心新兴大国的不满、能力和野心来调整秩序。
然而,今天,在特朗普政府的领导下,美国既是当今秩序的核心支柱,也是它的主要挑战者之一 ——这是一种很难夸大其词的双重性。



A degree of such ambiguity invariably inheres in any administration’s foreign policy: top officials neither publicize all of their internal debates nor telegraph every instance in which there may be gaps between America’s declared and actual policies on a given issue. Countries expend enormous effort—parsing official government documents, conducting private diplomacy, producing intelligence assessments and so forth—trying to discern others’ intentions. But execution matters more than intent: while Trump has rightly interrogated the nature and scope of America’s involvement in the postwar order, such is the momentum that often accompanies fundamental recalibrations that it risks producing overreaction. The continuation of an “America First” policy will compel long-standing allies to be more proactive in fashioning arrangements and institutions that circumvent America’s reach; consider, for example, the German foreign minister’s call for a new payments system independent of Washington, the aforementioned Japan-EU free trade deal, the establishment of an EU-China-working group that will consider how to upxe the WTO and growing coordination between the EUand China to write the rules that will govern global internet policy. A United States that is increasingly alone will be increasingly incapable of advancing its national interests.

这种程度的模棱两可总是存在于任何一届政府的外交政策中:
高级官员既不会公布他们的内部辩论,也不会对美国在某一特定问题上所宣布的政策与实际政策之间可能存在的差距进行通报。
各国付出了巨大的努力ーー分析官方政府文件、开展私人外交、进行情报评估等等ーー试图弄清其他国家的意图。
但是,执行比意图更重要:
尽管特朗普正确地审视了美国参与战后秩序的性质和范围,但这种动力往往伴随着根本性的重新调整,有可能导致过度反应。
继续奉行“美国优先”的政策,将迫使长期盟友更加积极主动地制定规避美国影响力的安排和制度;
例如,德国外交部长呼吁建立一个独立于华盛顿的新支付系统、上述的日欧自由贸易协定、建立一个欧盟-中国工作组以考虑如何更新世贸组织,以及欧盟和中国之间加强协调,制定管理全球互联网政策的规则。
一个越来越孤立的美国将越来越无力推进其国家利益。